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Abstract
This experiment xs an adaptation of previous finite 
state grammar studies* An implicit test group performed 
a series of learning trials to attempt to establish a 
degree of automatized learning. The success of this is 
questionable, however. A transfer phase was performed 
to test for any transfer effects and learning 
differential between implicit and explicit test groups, 
however no important effects were found. An assessment 
phase that tested the correlation of rule validities and 
proportion of correct responses indicated that subjects 
may have been aware of rules or elements of rules which 
consciously guide their decisions of the gra'smaticality 
of strings. Results of this study (implicit learning) 
will be compared to a parallel study measuring the same 
effects of learning in an explicit learning group.
The nature of symbolic representation has become a 
disputed topic within cognitive psychology. The 
majority of theoretical models and research support a 
standard view which focuses on unconscious symbolic 
representation. A more recently strengthened position 
is the alternative view which proposes a focus on 
conscious representation. Models incorporating elements 
of the standard view have several common underlying 
features* They can be grouped into a category called 
the separate systems view. The separate systems refer 
to the independent roles of the unconscious and 
conscious. Unconscious representation is considered 
dominant for most tasks. The proposed mechanism is one 
in which we receive information from the world and 
process it effortlessly and unconsciously. Models 
developed by Posner & Snyder (1975) and Collins * 
Quillian (1969) incorporate the separate systems 
approach* The common features of the models are 
connections between concepts along with activation.
This activation is considered to be unconscious, 
unattended# and parallel in nature. The conscious 
process is not considered to enter into representation 
at any significant level. It is encapsulated within a 
short term memory store and performs serially and with
limited domain. tli®'implication of these models is that 
we heed not be aware or attentive to the environmental 
stimuli to process information and form corresponding 
rules or connections. The description of consciousness 
in the separate systems view is limited in capacity and 
performance. Consciousness is often equated with an 
attentional role. Since what is consciously processed 
is only that which is attended to, the attended process 
is considered imperfect, effortful, and resources 
limited. In Rebers finite state grammar studies, he 
found that subjects who used conscious rules performed 
at a lower overall level and used imperfect rules to 
guide their decisions. Reber attributed this to the 
limitations of consciousness. Many studies exist 
supporting the standard view. Experiments presented 
will show some of the basic claims of unconscious
learning in the absence of conscious facilitation.
The alternative view takes a single system 
perspective of the analysis of symbolic representation. 
Consciousness is viewed as the only mode of 
representation. What the standard view perceives as 
unconscious is looked at as traces of consciousness in 
the alternative view. In Dulany's (1991) overview of 
the field, he makes a distinction according to the
view; What ’ is perceived * as m&miM&imB *1*
actually nonpropositiona1 traces from consciousness that 
are nonproductive* these traces are conscious 
representations which are indirectly activated by 
related concepts. What is conscious, conversely, is 
propositional and predictive.
These terms can be broken down to give a clearer 
distinction between standard and alternative theories. 
The nonpropos it iona1 traces that are compared to 
unconscious are associations between conscious contents
which are connected by some activation. This activation 
causes the connections in a way which make automatic 
responses. The connections are of a form in which there 
is "a remembrance of some element A". This remembrance 
of A is conscious in the sense that some activation of 
conscious contents in memory has activated element
A(Dulany, 1991)
Word fragment completion tasks can be viewed in 
terms of nonpropositional activation. Given word A in 
the acquisition phase, a subject might have the
remembrance of A leading to a successful completion of
the fragment. The single system views this as the 
nonpropositional activation of the letters because they
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the propositional aspect of consciousness are the 
associations between contents which are connected, yet 
allow choices much like hypothesis testiig. A 
remembrance that A is a member of set B. The 
propositional role of conscious representation is more 
like what the standard view would term as the limited 
role of consciousness, whereas the nonpropositional 
representation would be argued to be purely unconscious* 
Empirical support for the alternative view lies in 
the reanalysis and criticism of many of the standard 
view studies. The underlying assumptions they make are 
often disclaimed or reinterpreted. There is a great 
deal of room to develop these alternative views because 
of the minimal amount of direct support for separate 
system models. For example, critique of an expanded 
role of consciousness is strong, however there are few 
if any, genuine attempts to explain how consciousness 
interacts within an information processing framework.
Several areas of study have provided an arena to 
discuss the theoretical issue of the nature of 
representation. A brief overview of some studies will 
be presented to describe this area.
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Without Awareness
A foundation for unconscious representation was 
estbbliiMd from studies of learning without awareness. 
Semantic priming was demonstrated by Mackay (1973). 
Subjects were able to disambiguate stimuli presented in 
an attended ear by a word which was presented in an 
unattended ear. This provides support for the 
proposition that it is unnecessary to consciously attend 
to what is being processed.
Moray (1959) also showed effects of learning 
without awareness. A shock was paired with words in a 
learning phase, and in the test phase a galvanic skin 
response was elicited when one of the paired words was 
presented in the unattended ear. It seems that in a 
variety of circumstances and modalities unattended 
stimuli are processed and effectively used.
A criticism of these studies states that the actual 
task being performed is not unconscious learning, but 
low threshold switching to consciousness in the 
unattended ear (Hollender, 1986). Another problem is 
the distinction between awareness and attention. 
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Consciousness
determinntibn task performed along with a background 
distractor task. The subjects were limited in 
attentional resources and were unable to perform the 
explicit task above the level of the random condition.
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Studies of amnesics and Korsakov*s Syndrome 
patients have also been important support for the 
standard view of symbolic representation. These studies 
rely on a dissociation between the amnesics ability to 
perform above chance level on a testing phase while 
being unable to remember what the rules or exact nature 
of the task was. The dissociation can be viewed as the 
conscious and unconscious components of everyday 
learning. The conscious component is the ability to 
report rules verbally or by generation. The unconscious 
component of learning is the performance on the 
corresponding rules in a test phase. Since the rules 
cannot be reported, yet the task is performed 
increasingly well, this is taken as evidence for 
unconscious representation and the absence of conscious 
processing.
Cohen & Squire (1980) demonstrated this
in a mirror reading task. Amnesic subjects
words, yet showed a deficit in the corresponding word 
recognition task. According to the standard view 
evidence of conscious processing would be reflected in 
increased performance in word recognition.
Nissen & Builemer (1987) performed an experiment in 
which sequences ..of letters were presented to amnesics,'".''
They were judged on reaction time as a response to {■
placement on. the screen. They found that, subjects were
unable:, to report any sequence yet performance on the-
reaction time segment of the experiment increased. Once
again this dissociation was demonstrated.
Critics'of the. amnesic studies have a logical 
argument. The nature of memory loss is not completely 
understood and the neural pathways have hot been fully 
identified. Therefore, assumptions about the true 
deficits can be no more than speculations. It is 
entirely possible that amnesics cannot verbally report 
in a generation or recall task yet they may have had 
some initial awareness. This awareness may be 
interfered with because of the simple fact that the 
subjects are amnesics and not because they can only 
function with tacit knowledge.
The Stroop Effect
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The Stroop Effect (1935) has been a classical 
example which supports the standard view. Words of 
colors are read from a list written with colored 
letters. The effect demonstrated is that subjects have 
difficulty in quickly identifying the colors which is a 
color name itself. Even with practice, it has been 
shown that subjects still cannot avoid processing the 
distraction of the name. This demonstrates an inability 
of subjects to avoid using automatic unconscious 
'processing*'' The fact that after .'practice.'''it is still 
difficult for subjects to ignore the distraction shows 
that conscious processing i.s subordinate to unconscious 
processing (Kahneman, 1973).
Studies have been performed that have achieved 
different results than the typical Stroop experiments 
though. In some cases the Stroop Effect has actually 
been reversed. These findings bring the possibility 
that the seemingly unconscious process can actually be 
brought under conscious control (Greenwald & Rosenberg, 
1978).
SMSfeBBa Stu<jie3
The study of artificial systems has also touched 
upon the area of study involving the nature of symbolic 
representation* Typical studies involve interaction of
economic or production scenarios. The subjects control 
multiple variables in the system in order to achieve a 
set condition of the scenario. The important feature of 
these studies is that subjects are capable of improving 
performance in terms of maintaining a desirable level, 
yet when tested for ability to verbally express what 
factors influenced their decision, they are deficient.
Studies by Broadbent (1977) and Broadbent & Aston 
(1978) have shown that verbal tests following exposure 
to the artificial systems are not at the level of 
performance itself. This dissociation is associated 
with the different roles of conscious and unconscious 
representation. The verbal knowledge is viewed as the 
consciously represented material, serially processed and 
resulting in limited performance. The task itself can 
be looked at as unconsciously learned with the features 
of automaticity and efficiency (Johnson & Laird, 1983). 
Broadbent et al (1986) drew similar conclusions. They 
postulated that information verbalized was a 
simplification of anything learned, and therefore 
accessible to consciousness. The more complex, 
underlying knowledge cannot be verbalized because it is 
only processed at an unconscious level.
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Criticism of generalizations made from the system 
studies in terms of how information is processed focuses 
on the nature of verbal reports. The complexity of the 
studies in general makes it difficult to generalize 
about what the subjects can verbalize and under what 
conditions they can do so. For example, one set of 
subjects was exposed to a yoked design in which they 
were required to verbalize the task as a set of 
instructions for a new test group. The results 
indicated increased performance by the second group.
This indicates an effective conscious verbal 
performance.
Sequence Studies
The study of sequences has been another area of 
symbolic representation. Many of the 
■features and criticisms of this series.of studies 
parallel those of finite state grammar* The logic 
behind it’s use is that like finite state grammar, the 
elements of the task can be broken down into specific 
implicit and explicit tasks and be subsequently 
.■analyzed.
The study of sequences involves similar procedures 
for the original task and replications. Two groups are 
tested, one with a structured sequence and one with a
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random sequence. A  sequence of letters is given to one 
group through a series of trials and the subjects must 
press the button on a keypad according to the position. 
Corresponding reaction time is considered to demonstrate 
unconscious representation of rules. The test condition 
is one group that is considered to use tacit knowledge 
even though the sequence is eventually accessible to 
consciousness.
Nissen and Bullemer (1987) use the sequence of 
ietters presented in eight blocks of
ten trials;. They found significant differences between 
the pattern and randan conditions after only six 
repetitions of the sequence in the first block. This can 
be viewed as unconscious connections being made between 
the positions of the letters forming an overall rule 
because the awareness of the rule followed the increase 
in performance. A similar study was performed by 
Willingham, Wissen, & Bullemer (1919) with the addition 
of a generation task. After completing a set number of 
blocks, subjects were instructed to press a key 
corresponding to the next position or. the screen. This 
is considered a test under conscious control* The 
results of interest involved a subgroup of subjects who 
reported that they were unaware of the sequence as they
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performed the generation task, ey showed a decrease 
in reaction time in the first phase, yet performed at 
the level of the control group in the generation task. 
Once again, this was viewed as supporting evidence for 
implicit learning,
Lewicki, Bizot, & Hill (1987) used similar 
procedures to show that rules formed from their 
generated sequences are unconsciously represented. A 
sequence of five letters was presented in this case. 
Rules defining their positions were used as opposed to a 
set presentation order. Significant improvement was 
obtained throughout the first sixteen blocks, and 
declined as a new sequence was added for the last two 
blocks. In this case, the rules comprising the 
sequences had a greater degree of complexity and were 
unable to be reported by any subjects at the conclusion 
of the experiment. This experiment demonstrated 
unconscious representation of rules involved in a 
sequence. The confound of a general improvement due to 
the task itself is disqualified by the decrease in 
performance as the sequences were altered in the last 
two blocks.
The information gained from the previous studies 
seems rather clear and simple in its application to the
Const
topic of symbolic representation, implicit learning is 
demonstrated by a faster reaction time that accompanies 
successive trials, while subjects are unaware of the 
relationship among stimuli. Unfortunately for 
proponents of the standard view these results have not 
gone unchallenged. Several methodological issues have 
been identified and subjected to reexamination.
Perruchet, Gallego, & Savy (1990) performed a study 
to determine if the effects demonstrated in Lewicki, 
Hill, & Bizot (1987) could be described in terms of the 
individual nature of the specific strings used. They 
also wanted to asses the predictive value of conscious 
rules within the sequence paradigm as it has been shown 
in the finite state grammar studies.
The findings were consist€>nt with alternative view 
predictions. The string was broken into five serial 
positions (A,B,C,D,E) and compared throughout the 
seventeen trials. They found an alternative 
justification to the performance difference in the last 
two blocks in which the strings were changed. The 
overall probabilities of screen movements (horizontal 
and backward) and not the rule changes were correlated 
with performance. An additional test of explicit 
learning was also added. Between trials subjects were
( on& iousness 1
asked to verbalize probabilities of average movements. 
Subjects were able to accurately predict the percentage 
of movements demonstrating a conscious representation of 
the rules.
Perruchet & Amorim (1992) addressed several 
important methodological problems of the original 
sequence studies in a group of experiments. They 
focused on a more in-depth analysis of the explicit task 
of generation and added some new elements. The more 
fine-grained view broke down the sequence used by Nissan 
& Bullemer (1987) into reaction times, generations, and 
recognition values for each of the ten serial positions. 
’1‘heir concern in these areas related to how implicit the 
original generation task actually was. Nisssen and 
Bullemer used a generation task in which one sequence 
was generated, then a correction phase followed. 
Perruchet and Amorim hypothesized that this caused 
interference with representation because the task 
becomes too complex when new associations are learned. 
They tested with a free generation task that was 
believed to be more closely related to a reaction time 
task. A complete set of 100 letters was generated in 
this task.
( onsdousness
The results indicated that subjects were able to 
accurately represent serial associations in accordance 
with the reaction time' from each separate position of 
the sequence* They caution, though, that generation of 
full sequences or larger chunks may be due to random 
juxtapositions of smaller elements. This is predicted 
by the alternative view in the finite state grammar 
studies as wells partial, imperfect rules are 
represented consciously*
A second par f r the experiment involved the 
recognition of a series of four elements in the 
sequence. Subjects were presented with the ten groups 
of four (each set beginning with a successive letter in 
serial position) along with new sets not related to the 
sequence. They found that subjects were able to 
recognize four of them at a significant level over newly 
presented sets and the overall level was just below a 
significant level.
This information, along with the generation and 
xeaction time scores, were compared for each serial 
position, and a correlation of greater than .7 was found 
between the scored. Much like the validity scale used 
in the finite state grmmmt studies, this def&mstreted
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agreement between performance in explicitly and 
implicitly learned tasks.
Covariation Studies
The study of covariation has also provided evidence 
for and against both standard and alternative views.
The support for the standard view, again, lies in the 
dissociation between implicit and explicit performance. 
Superior performance was once again shown by the 
implicit learning group. The alternative view, once 
again, bases its argument on prediction of performance 
by consciously used rules.
Covariation studies examine reaction times 
associated with judgements regarding subjective 
personality traits given visual presentation of various 
facial features. Subjects are presented with faces 
having the predominant differential characteristic of 
either long or short hair. Associations of the hair 
length arc made to the dispositions of either a kind or 
a capable personality. Following a series of learning 
phases, subjects are given a test. Reaction time is 
measured following the question as to whether each 
person is kind or capable. The hypothesis of the 
standard view is that when asked, subjects will respond 
more slowly to faces which are matched with the actual
Const'
trait. Therefore, a ’yes'’ response should be slower 
that a "no” response.
The Giucksburg & Mckioskey model (1981) provides 
the basis for the standard view judgements. It predicts 
stages of memory search and retrieval for this process* 
In a "yes’* search, the connections between the face and 
personality trait is found in memory and is verified or 
disqualified considering the specific question* They 
predict that the reaction time is directly correlated 
to the association in this type of task (Lewicki, 1986). 
Results confirmed the hypothesis on this and some 
additional related test conditions.
The alternative view is expressed in a replication 
by bulany & Poldrack (1991). The same general task was 
performed using identical stimuli with a few 
modifications. The faces were presented in a 
counterbalanced order as opposed to the presentation of 
one group at a time. The results of the new study 
indicated no reaction time difference between groups.
A second replication was performed with no 
counterbalancing and the same reaction time difference 
that Lewicki found was also present. This refuted the 
claim that unconscious activation was caused by the
Consciousness
covariation and could be described by unconscious 
activation*
A second part of the study tested the validity 
measure of the rules that guide subjects in their 
judgements. Subjects were instructed to find any 
physical feature which seemed to be related to a 
personality trait. The validity score was use for “yes" 
responses. Subjects’ identified feature was compared to 
the individual slide to judge its correctness. The 
finding was that the rules they used may have been 
imperfect (in the sense that hair was not identified) 
yet they did not underpredict performance. This 
parallels both the finite state grammar and sequence 
findings.
Finite State Grammar
Finite state grammar studies have been used by both 
standard and alternative view proponents to describe how 
concepts are represented. The original studies in this 
area were used to demonstrate learning without awareness 
and unconscious representation. Through 
reinterpretation by researchers who favor a single 
system view, some conflicting results have been reached* 
The present study is a replication of a number of 
previous experiments.
The finite state grammar is a set of letters
Consciousness 22
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from a complex set of rules. These rules are considered 
to be too difficult for subjects to extract individually
Insert figure 1 about here 
The general structure of the finite state grammar 
studies involves comparison of two groups* An explicit 
group instructed to look for general rules to aid their 
performance, and an implicit group given no instructions 
other than to simply memorize the string.
The explicit group is assumed to form conscious 
rules and the implicit groups assumed to form 
unconscious rules. Conscious rules are believed to be 
used by the explicit group because subjects have more 
time to reflect on their responses and because they are 
aware that there is set of rules to be used.
Unconscious rules are believed to be used by implicit 
subjects because they are limited in time and are 
unaware of any rules which might guide their responses.
The utility of of the finite state grammar in the 
study of symbolic representation lies in the great 
degree of experimental control it offers. The rules 
that determine serial position are well defined and 
provide a means for concrete analysis. This allows for
4'-
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the prediction of probabilities of the appearance of 
first order rules as well. Also, verbal reports of 
rules are possible because the strings are formed from a 
sequence of letters.
The goal of these studies was originally to show 
that subjects were able to learn abstract unconscious 
rules. This was demonstrated in the test phase of the 
study.by above chance performance by the implicit group. 
This hypothetically showed that although subjects are 
unable to say what the rules are, they get a feeling as 
to the overall structure and can "unconsciously", use it
to increase overall performance. Reber (1985) labels 
this general process as implicit learning. This 
learning is guided by tacit knowledge which is 
considered a form of declarative knowledge that is 
inaccessible to consciousness {Reber, 1989).
The explicit group, the weak link of the two 
process theory, on the other hand, performed at a lower
overall level than the implicit group. This
demonstrated that conscious attention to the strings 
were not an effective means of representation. The 
interpretation of this is that conscious processes are, 
in most ways, inferior to the functioning of the tacit 
knowledge of the unconscious.
iSfaaiifSsiiiaisiS;-: ' ?.‘tH , t') V’ 4W A ‘ - * l . ' . . ■- ' »sh.
Con silo
The first important feature of the standard view is 
the subjects are learning a generalized rule (Reber, 
1969), These generalized rules are considered to to be 
guided by tacit knowledge outside the realm of 
consciousness. According to definition, the generalized 
unconscious rules should be superior tc the attention- 
guided conscious rules. The rules formed from tacit 
knowledge can be subsequently applied to future 
processes. For example, Reber presented strings 
governed by rules in the acquisition phase of the 
experiment. He then presented subjects with a grammar 
formed from new letters with the same rule structure in 
the test phase. Subjects in the implicit learning 
condition were still able to show learning effects in 
the test phase indicating what is unconsciously stored 
is a set of implicit rules that can be generalized to 
new stimuli with the same grammar structure. Evidence 
against conscious representation of rules was 
demonstrated by the inability of rules from the explicit 
condition to be generalized to the new grammar in the 
test condition.
Other research has has replicated the ability of 
subjects to use generalized rules in grammars (Brooks, 
1978), (Millward, 1981). A basic example that parallels
Consciousness
these finite state grammar studies is an everyday 
judgement about the grammaticality of a simple sentence 
(Reber 1985). If it is perceived as nongrammatical, it 
is not parsed and identified by elements, but is simply 
identified as wrong. In many cases, when asked to 
quickly say what is wrong, one doesn’t give a specific 
rule, just that it seemed wrong. This is an indication 
that unconscious rules exist in natural learning 
processes as well.
A second feature of the finite state grammar is the 
significant difference in performance of the implicit 
and explicit groups in the testing phase of the 
experiment. The implicit group performs at a higher 
overall level * This has replicated across several 
studies (Reber, 1967), (leber et al, 1980). At first it 
seems counter-intuitive that the group given no 
instructions to look for possible rules (implicit group) 
outperforms the group told to look for any rules 
(explicit group). However, it is consistent with the 
standard view of unconscious representation.
The implicit group is presumed to use tacit 
knowledge formed from the acquisition phase and apply it 
to the test phase. This, according to the standard 
view, should predict greater accuracy and better
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performance on related tasks because the unconscious 
processing is parallel and is not limited in resource
capacity. The explicit group, on the other hand, if 
they are using conscious rules, should perform less 
accurately and more poorly because they are using an 
effortful and limited resource. Brooks (1978) and Reber 
(1976) found evidence in support of both of these 
claims. Reber concluded that "looking for rules will 
not work if you cannot find them."
Criticism of the standard view has also directed 
effort into the study of finite state grammar. The 
focus, in this case, is more of a defensive approach.
Through replication and reinterpretation, alternate
thebretical conclusions have been drawn. Similar and
often identical procedures have been carried out leading 
to these explanations.* ''
An important methodological reinterpretation made 
by some advocates of the alternative view is that there 
is actually no significant difference in performance 
between the implicit and explicit group (Dulany, 
Carlson, & Dewey, 1984). Some researchers have even 
found an explicit group advantage in the task (Howard & 
Balias, 1980). This leads to numerous interpretations 
from both sides of the argument. Both point to
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methodological dissimilarities in the studies. There is 
the possibility that the explicit instructions are that 
effective because undergraduate students in the studies 
use a different sort of strategy in general. A "more 
explicit' test might be required. Reber, however, 
hypothesized that the explicit group is given too much 
of the underlying structure in some cases. This would 
negate the imprecise explicit rules which the subject 
would perform.
Another criticism of the standard interpretation 
relates to how global the hypothesized unconscious
iStl
learning is. Speculations by proponents of the 
alternative view lead to interest in testing whether 
individual connections between serial positions is 
actualiy what is learned. In addition, the imperfection 
of the smaller learned rules may not indicate 
imperfection in the conscious process if it can 
accurately predict actual performance. Therefore, 
learning that a string is nongrammatical may not be a 
general feeling, but the identification of a small part 
of the string that does not follow a consciously 
represented rule (Dulany et al,, 1984). For example a 
string of letters "FGMRM might be judged nongrammatical
\’V
'.
Consciousness 28
not because it ’'feels ungrammatical ” but because F seems 
as if it should not precede G.
This hypothesis is supported by performance in 
tasks which require subjects to give some verbal or 
written description of the rule they have used* it has 
shown that this feedback corresponds to their correlated 
performance and predictions* The standard view would 
predict that the implicit group should underpredict 
their performance more often that the explicit group. 
This is logical considering their claim that if someone 
learns a task and represents the rules unconsciously, 
they should not be able to predict the outcomes, even 
though performance increases.
Dulany et al.<1984} showed this effect using 
Rebers grammar and by adding a task in which subjects 
were to underline parts of a string which either made it 
grammatical or nongrammitical. This task is considered 
to involve conscious processes- A rule validity scale 
was implemented to asses the prediction of the conscious 
rules. The validity scale was basically the probability 
of the rule the subject used given the number of times 
the letter combination actually appeared. The outcome
were aware of what they had represented. 'Reber counters 
this argument by saying that the task that Dulany et il, 
used is still implicit and :s biased by task demand 
characteristics (Reber, 1985),
Per ruehet and Pactau (1991) took a slightly 
different approach with the same outcome. They 
presented two learning conditions. One was an implicit 
learning like Reber’s standard group, and one group 
learned only the associate pairs of letters with the 
same corresponding rules. Results in this study showed 
no difference in performance of the two groups* This 
indicates that both groups were actually using the same 
conscious strategies.
The most fundamental critique of the two systems 
interpretation of experimental results are directed 
toward their underlying '.claims * The standard view 
theorists base their argument upon an operational 
definition of implicit learning. It can, and has been 
argued that what is considered implicit and unconscious 
can actually be considered conscious. Justification for 
either stance requires leap of faith considering the 
weak links in both arguments. The present study is ar>
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The goals of this experiment were similar to those 
of previous finite state grammar studies* Initially, a 
series of ten learning blocks were presented in an 
attempt to establish a degree of automatized learning in 
an implicit learning group. A transfer block was used 
to measure the degree to whicn learning transfered to 
novel stimuli. An assessment block was used to measure 
the correlation of rule validities to proportion of 
responses which are correct.
Additional measures were also used to compare 
performance of the two test groups (implicit and 
explicit). An additional parallel experiment with an 
explicit learning group will also provide a means to 
further compare implicit and explicit groups.
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Method
Subjects were undergraduate students enrolled in 
an introductory psychology class at the University 
of Illinois. Two groups of subjects were run with 
16 subjects per condition. The conditions are the 
two arrangements of implicit learning condition and 
an implicit/explicit test phase.
Stimuli:
Stimuli consisted of letter strings constructed 
from a finite state grammar. There were four sets 
of 12 strings for a total of 48. Twelve were the 
original letter sets with an underlying grammar 
structure, twelve were new letters with the same 
grammar structure (letters transformed by 
incrementing on letter in the alphabet while 
following a parallel sequence of the original 
strings). Twelve were the original letters forming 
a novel string ( the same letters as the original 
set, but not presented). The last set of twelve 
were new letters forming novel strings (transformed 
letter set with a new string sequence). Within each 
set of twelve, half were grammatical half
rexpa&ieal* Strings were equal distributions of
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lengths three, five, or seven letters.
Insert Table 2 about here
Design:
Measurement of the effects of blocks, string 
length, transfer, and predictive rule assessment are 
within-subject factors. Comparison of effects of 
test groups is the between subject factor.
Procedure:
Each subject in the implicit learning condition 
was presentee a series of ten blocks consisting of 
48 strings (four times through the 12 strings in the 
original grammar-original strings list of composed 
of 6 grammatical and 6 nongrammaticai). The 
subjects indicated whether the string was 
grammatical or nongrammaticai followed by the 
experimenter's indication of the appropriate 
response.
Presentation of the strings was for one second 
with a .5 second warning period in which a "get 
ready!" prompt was flashed on the screen. The 
string was followed by a .5 second presentation of 
the true categorisation of the string. The total
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individual stimulus presentation time was two 
seconds.
The implicit learning condition subjects were 
given the followii g instructions:
During this experiment you will be asked 
to learn about two kinds of letter strings. 
Half of the strings are judged to be well- 
formed by another group of subjects, and half 
were judged to be not well-formed. We will 
show you strings that are well-formed, 
followed by a W, and strings not we 1.1-formed 
followed by an N.
For example,
LFJC W (well-formed)
Or for example,
FCRJ N (not)
Your task will be to classify strings as 
W or N before we tell you the classification.
The well-formed strings called W have a 
certain look, and those that are not and 
called N have a different look. Each time you 
see a string, clear your mind and respond with 
the first thing that comes to mind, either W 
or N. And each t~me you see a string 
classified as W or N, just clear your mind and 
experience the string and the W or N together.
On each of the first 10 trials there will 
be a 3/2 second warning and the string will be 
presented for 1 second followed by its 
classification as W or N for 1/2 second. On 
each trial, you should respond accurately and 
quickly when the string appears, and it is 
especially important for you to respond within 
that 1 second.
At the start, you'll have to quess 
whether the string is a W or an N, but as the 
trials go on, you should acquire a feeling for 
what is W or N and be able to judge which the 
string is.
The transfer phase for the Implicit and explicit 
test group was performed as the eleventh block. It 
was composed of one presentation of the 12"old 
strings along with one presentation of 36 new 
strings in a random order. The 36 strings were from 
three sets of 12 new strings. One was composed of 
the same letter set, but with novel strings. The 
last two are new letter sets created by incrementing 
each letter one place in the alphabet sequence. One 
of these had a previously presented string of 
letters, one a novel string. Therefore, half of the 
stimuli presented had letters identical to those 
which were used in the first ten blocks, half had 
the same string sequences. The time interval was 
identical to the first ten blocks, 
instructions for the implicit test group are as
During the next block of trials some 
things will be the same and some things will 
be different. The first 24 strings will be 
formed with the letters you’ve been seeing, 
but the second 24 will be formed with new 
letters *
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On each trial there will be a .5 second 
warning, a string will be presented, and you 
will have 1 second in which to say whether you 
think it is well formed, a W, or not, an N.
When you see a string made with old letters, 
you should clear your mind and respond with 
the first thing that comes to mind, either w 
or N. And when you see a string made with new 
letters, you should also just clear your mind 
and respond with the first thing that comes to 
mind, either W or N.
The transfer phase for the expf icit test group was 
performed as the eleventh block par all to to that of ne
Implicit test group* It was composed of one 
presentations of the 12 old strings arong with one 
presentations of 36 new strings in a random order. The 
time interval was the important variation. Three 
seconds were given to respond with the same .5 second 
warning interval, instructions.were as follows:
Puring the next block of trials some 
things will be the same and some thin . • will 
be different. The first 24 strings wi.1 be 
formed with the letters youve been seeing, 
but the second 24 will be formed with new 
letters. . ■ ■
On each trial there will be a i second 
warning, a string will be presented, and you 
will have 3 seconds in which to say whether 
you think it is well formed, a W, or not, an 
It. When you see a string made with old 
letters, you should try to remember and use 
what suggested strings were W or M before, 
filien you see a string made with new letters, 
yen should also try to reiaember what made 
strings W or W before— and you can use that 
information to classify strings with new
. .t IT ■ #111:
letters, if you figure out the relationship of 
the new letters to the old letters.
The' twelfth block was an assessment' block used to'
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obtain rule reports for both implicit and explicit 
test groups. The implicit test group was exposed to
48 strings composed of the 24 new and 24 old 
strings. Each of the 48 presentat ions was precede 
by three dummy trials to get subjects up to speed. 
All presentations were under the same tame 
parameters as the implicit test group *n block 
eleven. After each presentation of the 48 strings, 
the subjOh % under i ined thi* pa1 1  o 1 the string wh ic!i 
suggests grammar leaf i ty or nongi'amma/ticalitythus 
indicating a rule", 
instructions are as. follows;
During the next bioex of triais some 
things again w i n  again be the same*
On each trial there will be a . t second 
warning, a string will be presented, and you 
will have 1 second in which to say whether you 
think it is well-formed, a W, or not, an N. 
When you a string made with old letters, you 
should clear your mind and respond with the 
first thing that comes to mind, either W or N, 
And ^hen you see a string made with new 
letters, you should also just clear your mind 
and respond with the first thing that comes to 
mind, either W or N.
The new and very important thing is this* 
immediately after every fourth trial, you
i -dCf JfSi? , MittiiiS -3ii ^  C.
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should report what it was about the string 
that actually suggested to you that it was a W 
or N at the time you responded. After you 
classify the string, you will see numbers 
appear indicating the position in order of 
each letter. Type one number that marks the 
start and one number that marks the end of 
whatever actually suggested to you that the
string was a W or N whpii you responded
For .example, if y<uy see
■ LFJC
1234
And
21.
FJ Sugyes red w or N to you, you would type
r rU 4 LFJC suggested W or N to you, you would type
And if F suggested W oi. N to you, you would type
22.
Use the numbers along the top of the 
keyboard for responding. Be sure to report 
what you thought at the time you classified 
the string.
The explicit test group were exposed to the same 
48 strings. These strings were preceded by three 
dummy trials. The time parameters, again, were the 
same as in the explicit learning condition.
Subjects indicated grammatically by underlining 
segments of the string which indicate underlying 
rules following each of the 48 presentations.
During the next block of trials some 
things again will again be the same;
On each trial there will be a i second 
warning, a string will be presented, and you
will havs 3 seconds in which to say whether 
you think it is well-formed, a W, or not, an 
N. When you a string made with old letters, 
you should try to remember to and use what 
suggested strings were W or N before. When 
you see a string made with new letters, you 
should also try to remember what made strings 
W or N before— and you can use that 
information to classify strings with new 
letters if you figure out the relationship of 
the new letters to the old letters.
The new and very important thing is "his:
Immediately after each trial, you should 
report what it was about the string that 
actually suggested to you that it was a W or N 
at the time you responded. After you classify 
the string, you will see numbers appear 
indicating the position in order of each 
letter. Type one number that marks the start 
and one number that marks the end of whatever 
actually suggested to you that the string was 
a W or N when you responded.
For example, if you see
LFJC 
1234
And FJ suggested W or N to you, you would 
23.
If LFJC suggested W or N to you, you would 
14.
And if F suggested W or N to you, you would type
22.
Use the numbers along the top of the 
keyboard for responding. Be sure to report 
what you thought at the time you classified 
the string.
/.Results
Learning of the finite State Grammar '
Subjects in the implicit learning condition 
performed above chance level on proportion correct 
responses in the ten learning blocks of the study 
indicating a degree of learning of the grammar. Mean
proportion correct across subjects was .603 (N = 36).
By repeated measure within-subject analyses of 
variance (ANOVA), dependent variables proportion 
correct, number of ontime responses, and reaction time 
all showed significant effects of the block factor,
F( 9,297) » 21.3, p < .00001, F(9,306) - 15.7, p <
.00001, and F<9,297) * 7.5, p < .00001 respectively.
Insert Figure 2,3,4 about here
String length was also a factor, F(2,66) = 34.6, 
p < .00001, F(2,68) * 19.7, p < .00001, and F(2,66) = 
25.1, p < .00001 respectively. A block*string length 
interaction to test for differential effects of 
proportion correct, ontime responses, and reaction 
across learning blocks indicated only significant 
effects for proportion correct, F(18,594) * 2.18, p * 
.0038. For ontime responses and reaction time, no
Const
significant effects were found, F<i8,6I2) * .57, g *
.92, F(18,594l = 1.04, p » .42 respectively.
Proceduralization of Learning 
■ mentioned above, a significant increase in
proportion correct within the one second trials was 
demonstrated. This is an indication of procedural 
learning. A cost criterion of automaticity was not 
evident, however? no effect of old letter set versus 
new letter set was found for test blocks eleven and 
twelve in a repeated measure ANOVA with dependent 
variables proportion correct and reaction time. F(X # 34} 
- .06, p > .46, and F(1,34) - .18, p ~ .68 
respectively.
Tranafex of Learning
Transfer of learning is evident in c~ses where 
performance increases are revealed in later test of 
memory. A comparison by within-subject t-tests of block 
one (first twelve trials of old strings old letters) and 
the four string groups (blocks eleven) with dependent 
variable proportion correct indicated transfer to old 
strings-old letter set in both the implicit and explicit 
test groups, £(17) * 2.11, p * .05, '£(17) 3.8, p
=.0014*
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T-tests between block one and the other three 
string types showed no significant transfer effects in 
either implicit or explicit test groups. For old 
strings-new letters, t(17) = .71, p = .49, t(17) - 1.04, 
P ~  .31. For new strings-oid letters, '£(17) « 1.28, p » 
.22, t(17) « .66, p. « .52. 'For new strings-new letters, 
t ( 17) = ,56, p ~ .58, t(17) - '.57, p - .58.
A repeated measure ANOVA with dependent variable 
proportion correct indicated no significant effect of 
the factor test condition for blocks eleven and twelve, 
F( 1,34) « 3.1, p *■ .088.
Insert Figure 5 about here
Rule Assessment
Proportion of correct responses should be 
predicited by a rule validity as measured by +he 
VALSCORE program (Dulany, et al., 1984). The VALSCORE 
program provides a metric for subjects’ reports of rules 
asserting features of a string which suggest the 
grammaticality or well-formedness of a strings. This 
metric for rules can be viewed as the validity of 
features* P( Event is in the category / Feature i in in 
the event). Validities for a rule on a trial are
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computed as P( String] is well-formed / Feature, is in the 
String)) if the string is classified as well-formed, and 
PfString] is not well-formed / Featurej is in the 
String]) if the string is classified as not weil-fonned.
■ i - . subjects report features of the strings in rules 
they use to guide their grammaticality judgements, the 
rule validities should predict the proportion of correct 
responses.
Correlation of mean rule validities and proportion 
correct was made over the 48 strings in block twelve 
(four string types combined), r ~ .77, slope - 0.850, 
intercept = 0.110.
Insert Figure 6 about here
For none of the subjects did the binomial test 
reveal a significant standardized residual between 
performance observed and performance predicted by rule 
validity, p < .05. Observed frequency of correct 
responses did not depart reliably from what would be 
expected from subjects* mean validity of rules and 
number of ontime responses*
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\ '.Discussion
The analyses of interest focus on three main issues. 
Measurement of proceduralized learning, transfer, and 
the relation of rule validities to performance. 
Measurement of learning is important to establish a 
transformation from an initial purely deliberative 
operation st'*te to level of proceduralized learnings 
With significant indication that proceduraiization has 
been achieved, transfer tests and rule assessment can be 
examined while being theoreticaliy isolated from 
deliberative processes.
Learning of the grammar was indicated by increased 
performance over learning blocks, however, 
proceduraiization of learning was not. completely 
supported by the results. Although significant increases 
in proportion of correct responses, number of entire 
responses, and significant reduction of reaction tine 
existed, no cost criterion of automaticity .s evident 
in the comparison of new and old letter sets in blocks 
eleven and twelve. This effect, however, may have been 
due to the elimination of responses which were not 
recorded as ontime. This could occur if reaction time 
was above the one second deadline but were filtered, 
leaving significantly lower reaction time values.
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Therefore, even though subjects were responding more 
slowly to new letter sets, elimination of responses not 
recording ontime would not be factored into the mean 
reaction time*
Transfer of learning was not demonstrated to the 
three string types with at least one novel element 
(either strings or letter sets). In addition, no 
differential was found between test groups. This lack 
of transfer is not surprising considering the time 
limitations of the learning phase. It questions the 
assumption that a purely unconscious implicit process 
would underlie the performance demonstrated in a finite 
state grammar task.
This lack of transfer is expected by an alternative 
view of the implicit process (Dulany 1991). in this 
view, implicit is the activation of conscious contents 
by others that have been associated. These cor tents 
would be described as sense of grammaticality, 
activated by a sense of awareness of the string feature. 
Transfer would only be expected in cases in which 
significant overlap of features exists. Comparison to 
the parallel experiment with a preliminary explicit 
learning phase will give a better understanding of 
transfer differences.
"Jv
Constlousness
The rule assessment phase of the experiment 
provided a means to compare actual performance with what 
was consciously represented by subjects in rules. The 
correlation of a mean validity score with proportion 
correct provides evidence that what is actually being 
used is a consciously represented set of rules. These 
rules are assumed to be conscious because they are 
chosen by subjects: who are aware of the selection they 
are making in an isolated segment of the assessment 
block.
Features chosen by subjects cannot be perfectly 
identified by mean validity scoies within VALSCORE 
because features within rules will vary between 
subjects. Therefore, rules which seemed to best 
describe the grammaticality judgment were chosen; in 
this case either presence of a feature anywhere in the 
string, or presence of a feature in a specific location.
This challenges the assumption that representation 
of strings by an implicit learning group is outside 
subjects * awareness and subsequent judgments of 
grammaticality are unconscious. The fact that string 
fragments are indicated as rules does not diminish the 
strength of this result. This demonstrates that what is 
represented consciously is not necessarily a complete
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all-encompassing rule, but a partial, yet effective
rule.
The absence of a significant residual indicates 
that no margin exists for unconscious implicit learning 
and remembering.
(oust iousness
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fable l. Four sets of finite state grammar strings 
presented in learning and test phases.
ORIGINAL STRINGS ORIGINAL Lli'lTLR SI-1 
Grammatical Nongrammatical
I.Kl i Kt
ki nt:
i.ki jt: i Kin
IC K I ’R 11R IK
icncji ii.Riic!
1.1 IC Kt K I l ie KI.K
ORIGINAL STRINGS NEW LETTER SET 
Grammatical NongranmaHcal
l.l K Ml
Id III
1.1 IK I 
I IK l’R
I.K F |C I'R  IX IR F Id
i'C R IIC l IC R I ’IK I.
NEW STRINGS
'imfem-
aisas
G D G K D K M
M G KOSG S
ORIGINAL LETTER SET
M SK
m i )
M S G M IJ
GKSGS
G M SG K D K
M G K D S M S
NSW STRINGS 
Gramntttfcal
a m
M t)K D K
i p p t D M
N E W  L F f W S E T  
N«kgiaiimtaHcal
G M K
M G KSK
GK.SGS
M D S G K P M
G DSG K SM
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Figure Captions
Schematic diagram of finite state grammar* 
Old letters listed first, new letters in
Proportion of correct responses for string- 
length across learning blocks (1-10)* 
Ontime responses for string-length across
learning blocks <1—10)
Reaction time for string-length across 
learning blocks (1-10),
Transfer from the first twelve trials of 
block one (old string-old letters) to the 
four string groups in test blocks eleven 
and twelve.
. ^jaffer^lot of the of
responses and the mean validity of rules 
within subjects <r* * *5f4).
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